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Abstract
Anonymity of persons and services on the Internet has been an area of growing interest in academia and industry. In this paper,
we review work on visualization tools for teaching information security and assurance. We then focus on concepts related to
anonymous connections, Onion Routing (OR) protocol, and Tor network. We also present a visualization tool, VISACOR, to
demonstrate these concepts. The tool can be used as part of an active and blended instructional strategy for courses related to
information security and assurance. We broke down the whole system into several modules that collectively allow the learners to
better master the core components, communications, and various modes of operations to achieve anonymity. As a design principle,
we aimed to make the tool interactive, comprehensive, and easy to use through animation and user-friendly graphical interface.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the interest in information security and assurance has been growing rapidly. With the in-
creasing volume and complexity of the Internet security-related threats and the demand for specialists in this hot area,
teaching information security and assurance (ISA) has moved to a new era where full academic programs have been
dedicated to it. However, there are several problems and concepts that beginners ﬁnd diﬃcult to learn and understand.
The advances in computer-based teaching, active and blended learning, and visualization technologies have attracted
the attention of many researchers and educators to enhance the course delivery in order to engage students more in
learning so that they can eﬀectively understand and retain concepts1–5.
Among the very active areas in information security is private and anonymous communication6. While cryptogra-
phy can be used to scramble the messages to protect against eavesdropping, anonymous connections can additionally
hide the identity of the parties involved in the communication. Hence, such connections can protect not only against
eavesdropping but also against traﬃc analysis to make tracing activities back to the source harder. For example, per-
sons surﬁng the world-wide web or sharing ﬁles online may desire to protect their privacy from both the network
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and outside observers. This censorship-resistant requirement can be crucial to many people using the Internet, es-
pecially if their transactions are of special kind7. For instance, activists, bloggers and journalists may want to hide
their identities from the monitoring authorities. Therefore, their privacy is very important to protect themselves from
suspicious activities. Consequently, encryption alone is not enough, but it is required to completely hide the identity as
well. Anonymous communication can also be useful in several other situations or work in hostile environments, e.g.
hiding an analyst identity while investigating a malware to avoid counter attack, allowing a security expert to bypass
network security policies during penetration testing of the network and services, allowing commuters to connect to
their home network and services through the Internet when VPN is not available, maintaining privacy in ad-hoc and
sensor networks8.
Several systems, models and protocols have been developed to provide unlinkability or untraceability between
the received messages and their true senders and between the sent messages and their true recipients. The Onion
Routing (OR) protocol is one of the widely-used techniques to anonymize communications9. The user will remain
unidentiﬁed by the destination or any node in the middle between the source and the destination. Using OR provides
the user anonymous connections that are powerful enough to resist eavesdropping and traﬃc analysis attacks. The
ﬁrst implementation release of The Onion Routing was launched in 2002 and is known as Tor project (https://www.
torproject.org/)10. It uses SOCKS proxy interface and multiple encrypted tunnels to achieve its goals. Formal
descriptions and analyses of anonymity and onion routing are presented in11,12.
Onion routing involves several complex concepts that may generally require excessive eﬀort from the instructors to
explain them to beginners in the Information Security and Assurance (ISA) discipline. In order to address this concern,
we have developed a tool named VISACOR to VISualize Anonymous Connections based on Onion Routing. Our goal
in this paper is to discuss work related to instructional visualization tools for ISA. Moreover, we review anonymity
and onion routing based concepts, then we describe the design and implementation of the VISACOR visualization
tool. We ﬁnally provide some sample cases to demonstrate the tool.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work on visualization tools for information
security and assurance education. Section 3 provides a brief review of the important background concepts of Onion
Routing as a tool for achieving anonymity. Then, we discuss the design and implementation of our visualization tool,
VISACOR, in Section 4. After that, we show demonstrations of some cases in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the paper and highlights future work.
2. Visualization Tools Related Work
Using visualization to help understanding, retention and reasoning about important concepts has been shown to
be a very eﬀective instructional strategy13. It has been used in several areas in computer science education including
networking, algorithms and data structures14,15.
With the increasing interest in information security and assurance, a number of visualization attempts have been
found in the literature. For instance, three educational tools for undergraduate-level security classes are described
in1. These tools were developed using Macromedia Flash and can be used to demonstrate packet sniﬃng, Kerberos
authentication, and attacks on wireless networks. They have been used and found to be eﬀective in security-related
courses at the Department of Computer Science at North Carolina A&T State University.
In information security, denial of service (DoS) attacks are very attractive for hackers to disrupt or ruin the avail-
ability of a computing system or service. The attack can be launched in a variety of forms such as SYN ﬂood,
fragmented or malformed packets, ICMP ﬂood, smurf ampliﬁer, ping ﬂood, application-level ﬂood, reﬂective and co-
operative distributed denial of service (DDoS). In16, a visualization-based simulator is described to help students gain
knowledge of SYN ﬂood attacks. The tool demonstrates normal network traﬃc and how a SYN ﬂood attack occurs. It
also shows how to prevent SYN ﬂood attacks via a ﬁrewall. It was developed in the Department of Computer Science
at North Carolina A&T State University and used in COMP 620 Information, Privacy and Security in fall 2010.
Another interactive visualization tool called GRASP is described in17 to be used in an undergraduate information
security class. This tool allows users to interact with arbitrary protocols in a user-controlled stepwise manner.
Firewalls and packet ﬁltering represent a core area in information security. A number of visualization tools have
developed to explain and analyze various ﬁrewall-related concepts and conﬁgurations, e.g.18–20. An education tool
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for ﬁrewall simulation is presented in21. This tool can be used to show how the ﬁrewall works through interactive
sessions.
In the heart of information security and assurance comes cryptology. In 1998, various German Universities and
companies have started a project for an open source software to teach cryptography and cryptanalysis; this tool is
known as CrypTool (https://www.cryptool.org/en/). Another attempt can be found in22 where the authors
designed a tool to help students not only better understand the concepts of cryptography, but also gain signiﬁcant
knowledge of various algorithms and processes of key generation, encryption and decryption. More recently, sev-
eral visualization technologies for cryptographic concepts, algorithms and protocols are explored in2. A group of
researchers and collaborators at Michigan Technological University (http://www.cs.mtu.edu/~shene/NSF-4/)
has been engaged in the development and utilization of a number of other visualization prototypes related to cryptog-
raphy including DESvisual23, ECvisual24, AESvisual25, RSAvisual26, VIGvisual27, and SHAvisual28. For instance,
ECvisual can be used for teaching ciphers based on elliptic curves over the real ﬁeld and over a ﬁnite ﬁeld of prime
order. In this tool, there are two modes: demo mode and practice mode. The demo mode can be used for classroom
presentations and self-study whereas the practice mode allows learners to go through computations by themselves and
check the answers using the tool.
3. Understanding OR
As mentioned above, concealing the identity of the Internet users was a concern for many persons involved in
special kinds of communications, e.g. bloggers, whistleblowers, journalists, human-rights workers and spies. Even
ordinary users may desire to conceal their identities from any surveillance activities. The concept of Onion Routing
(OR) has come to provide online anonymity over the public network. It has been developed by the US Naval Research
Laboratory in late 1990s. The software implementation of onion routing is given the acronym Tor (a.k.a. The Onion
Routing). The Tor network or OR network consists of a set of nodes voluntarily running the Tor software.
3.1. OR Terminology
First, we should be clear about some OR-related terminology that we will use repeatedly in this paper and in OR
simulation environment. In onion routing, the sending application is known as the ‘originator’ or ‘initiator’ and the
receiving application is known as the ‘responder’. The initiator communicates to the responder through a sequence
of randomly selected intermediate nodes known as ‘onion routers’. The sequence of nodes from the initiator to the
responder is known as ‘circuit’ or ‘chain’. The ﬁrst node in a circuit or chain is known as ‘entry node’ whereas
the last node is known as ‘exit node’ and the other intermediate nodes are known as ‘relay nodes’. Each node in
the Tor network has a public key and a private key to be used later in encryption/decryption of the messages that
come from the OR users (originators or initiators). Information about nodes in the OR network is stored in special
nodes called ‘directory nodes’ or ‘directory servers’. In onion routing network, an ‘onion’ refers to a special type of
data structures that encapsulates messages through successive layers of encryption which is analogous to the onion
vegetable. Exchanged messages are carried in ﬁxed-length packets known as ‘cells’. The Tor network is an overlay
network of anonymous connections over the long-standing network connections between onion routers. The ‘degree
of anonymity’ is a quantitative information-theoretic measure based on the concealment guarantee achieved by the
Tor network to its users.
3.2. How OR Works?
OR is similar to a virtual private network (VPN) in that both can hide the initiator’s true IP address from the
intermediate nodes. However, the true IP address is known to the VPN server (the exit point). In contrast, OR has the
ability to hide the true identity of the anonymous-connection initiator from the responder (and vice versa) and also
from the onion routers on the path from the initiator to the responder (even if they are compromised). Each node on
the path from the initiator to the responder is only aware of its upstream node and its downstream node. Messages
from the initiator are forwarded from node to node until they reach the exit node where they are ﬁnally forwarded to
the responder. Once an onion router receives an onion data structure, it peels oﬀ the outermost layer, determines the
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next hop address, then forwards an embedded onion to the next hop. Note that messages are transmitted from node to
node in encrypted form and remain secure as long as they are in the Tor network. But, messages from the exit node to
the responder are in plaintext.
The operation of the onion routing network is composed of four phases: (1) network setup, (2) connection setup, (3)
data movement, and (4) connection destruction. During the network setup phase, the network topology is predeﬁned
and long-standing connections are established between neighboring onion routers. During the second phase, the
initiator asks a directory node to return information about a set of nodes (e.g. three nodes) to start a secure and
anonymous communication over the Internet. The directory node replies with the requested information including
the public key of each node. In the next step, the initiator shares a session key with each of the three nodes. This
shared key will be used to encrypt/decrypt messages exchanged between the initiator and each node separately using
a symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm. To do so, the initiator uses the Diﬃe-Hellman (DH) key exchange
algorithm. It sends its half of the DH key to the entry node encrypted with the public key of the entry node. Upon
receiving this message, the entry node decrypts it and uses its own half of the DH key to form the shared session key.
At this point the shared key is only available to the entry node but not to the initiator. To get the shared key at the
initiator, the entry node sends its half of the key in a plaintext message to the initiator. The entry node also sends the
hash of the shared key to let the initiator verify the the end result. The initiator then adds the received half of the key
to its half of the key and checks if the hash of the result equals the hash that comes form the entry node. Now, both
nodes have agreed on the same key in a secure manner. Similarly, the initiator should agree on a session key with the
second node which is called a relay node. The initiator follows a similar procedure using DH algorithm except that all
the communications between the initiator and the relay node should go secure through the entry node. Therefore, the
initiator creates a packet containing its half of the DH key encrypted with the public key of the relay node. This part
of the packet can only be decrypted by the relay node. The initiator embeds this packet inside another packet that is
encrypted with the shared key between the initiator and the entry node. It’s like covering the packet by another layer.
The outermost layer is encrypted by the shared key between the initiator and the entry node, in this packet the only
information is just asking the entry node to forward the encrypted content of this packet to the second node, which is
the relay node. This type of packets, called relay packets or cells, is not interpreted by the entry node but only relayed
to the next node (a.k.a. relay node).
Relayed cells or packets come with many types. At this point, the goal of the initiator is to extend the circuit to add
the next node. The entry node once opens the packet, it ﬁnds that the initiator asks to extend the circuit to the relay
node. The entry node will change the type of the relay cell to another type called “control cell” this type is used to
extend the circuit to the next node. The entry node sends this control cell to the relay node which decrypts it to obtain
the initiator’s DH half key and adds it to its half key to create a shared key with the initiator. Now, the relay node has
shared a key with the initiator without being aware of who or where the initiator is. The relay node replies back to
the entry node that it is added to that circuit and provides its half key with the hash of the shared key. The entry node
receives this packet and relays it back to the initiator saying that the circuit is now extended.
The initiator can repeat the above steps until it shares a key with each of the three nodes in the circuit. At the end
of these steps, the result is sharing a key with each node to use it to encrypt each layer of the cell and form the ‘onion’,
and each node will decrypt only the part that is encrypted with its shared key with the initiator. This is what gives this
technique the name onion routing, because the message or the packet is like an onion vegetable consisting of layers
(layers of encryption with diﬀerent keys and each node will decrypt and read its related part only).
The ﬁnal node in the circuit, a.k.a. the exist node, is what is actually acts on behalf of the initiator. It’s the node
that gets the command from the initiator to connect to a remote server and the type of data that the initiator wants from
that server. The server (responder) sees only the exit node as its client (through a proxy) and the initiator is completely
out of the image (or unidentiﬁed to the responder).
After the anonymous connection is established, the next phase is to transfer data from the initiator to the responder
(forward transfer) and from the responder back to the initiator (backward transfer). This process is in essence similar
to the connection-setup phase. When the data transfer phase is complete, the anonymous connection is cleaned up.
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Fig. 1: Main screen of the VISACOR tool.
4. OR Visualization Tool Design and Implementation
From the previous section, we can clearly notice the existence of several concepts and operations that may require
a lot of eﬀort to understand and explain to students for the ﬁrst time. To help students engage and retain these
concepts, we developed a visualization tool called VISACOR. In this section, we describe the details of this tool.
Users with basic knowledge about information security are expected to beneﬁt from the tool. Those with concepts
such as asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic algorithms, key exchange methods, packets routing, client server
concepts and exchanging packets in protocols like HTTP will be capable of interacting comfortably with the tool and
get the most beneﬁt of it.
The principle design criteria of our visualization tool are as follows. It should be to be easy to use through a
user friendly graphical interface. It should be appealing and interactive to engage students in learning. It should use
animations to explain concepts and operations related to onion routing. It should use audio-visual eﬀects to be useful
for a wide group of users including those with audio or visual impairments. We broke down the tool into the following
manageable modules:
• About: provides general information about the visualization tool.
• Flash Card Glossary: provides deﬁnition for important terminology related to anonymity and onion routing.
• Anonymity: explains the basic knowledge about anonymity and onion routing. The various types of messages
and components and their roles in achieving anonymous connections.
• OR Inner Works: represents the core of the tool. It allows the user to understand the required software, settings
and operations to construct circuits, move data forward and backward, and destroy connections.
• Location-Hidden Services: demonstrates how services can be anonymized in the Tor environment.
• OR Related Concerns: discusses various issues, weaknesses and critiques on anonymity connections and onion
routing including security concerns, cryptographic overhead, load balancing and latency performance. It also
explains how to measure anonymity quantitatively.
• Test Understanding: allows the user to take a quiz to test his understanding of covered concepts and operations.
The tool is aimed to be comprehensive, clear and easy to use. Therefore, we divided the content into scenarios
and each scenario is represented in the form of scenes. The tool was developed using Adobe Flash Professional CS6.
The main screen of the tool is shown in Figure 1. The user can select any of the main sections in the tool to explore
its details. In every scene there is a button to return to the main screen. We use animations and text to explain the
concepts and sequences of operations. We also used synchronized audio ﬁles generated using text-to-speech (TTS) to
help users with visual impairment to beneﬁt from the tool.
5. Demonstration of Sample Cases
5.1. Anonymity?
In this section of the tool, there is a brief introduction about anonymity and onion routing. It explains to the learner
the main components that make up the OR and how they are ordered. The user interacts with the scene by clicking on
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2: (a) Main components of Onion Routing, (b) Cell scene.
(a) End of Step 1 (b) End of Step 2 (c) End of Step 3 (d) End of Step 4
Fig. 3: Demonstration of connection setup from the initiator to the exit node.
each component to learn more about its role in the anonymity support system. Concepts covered here are essential for
a beginner to understand basic knowledge of OR and continue using the tool. Later, the user can optionally skip this
part and explore the rest of the sections. As an example, Figure 2 (a) shows the main components in onion routing
where the user can click and learn more about each of them. The user must also understand the type of messages used
in OR and the way each packet/cell is organized. Figure 2 (b) shows the cell scene which explains everything related
to cells. Some of the cells are called control cells which will be interpreted by the receiving node. Other cells are
called relay cells which will not be interpreted by the receiving node, instead they will be forwarded to the next node.
5.2. Inner Works: Connection Setup
This section of the tool provides the core operations and related concepts in onion routing. These concepts include
key exchange and encrypting/decrypting messages. The steps in this section are ordered logically to mimic the reality
of OR. When interacting with this scene, colors are used to avoid confusion of mixing concepts. Among the important
operations is circuit construction or connection setup from the initiator to the exit node as demonstrated in Figure 3.
The details are explained as follows:
5.2.1. The initiator picks nodes
The ﬁrst step discusses how the initiator picks a set of onion routers (nodes) from a directory node and how the
communication process proceeds. In this step, we use animation to visualize the messages transmitted by each party
involved in this process. The animation starts by the initiator asking the directory node for a set of nodes, e.g. the
initiator wants three nodes. The directory node will reply with the information about the three nodes and how to
connect with them using the addresses and the public keys to encrypt the communication among them. The initiator
goal at this step is to collect the information about the node to prepare for the next step which is sharing a session key
with each node in the circuit.
5.2.2. Key exchange with entry node
This step visualizes the how the initiator agrees on a key with the ﬁrst node in the circuit (the entry node). With this
key, the initiator and the entry node will encrypt and decrypt all communications between them using a symmetric
cryptographic algorithm. The user will see how they agree on the key using Diﬃe-Hellman algorithm to exchange the
key in a secure manner.
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5.2.3. Key exchange with relay node
After the previous step, the circuit consists of the initiator and the entry node. Now, the initiator wants to extend
the circuit to add the next node (the relay node). The initiator has the public key of the relay node and will repeat the
same steps used to agree on a key. The communication between the initiator and the relay node will pass through the
entry node, but the entry node will not have access to the data that is encrypted using the public key of the relay node.
The entry node will see only the information related to relaying or routing of the message. In case there are multiple
entry nodes, the process is repeated to extend the circuit to other nodes one by one.
5.2.4. Key exchange with exit node
The initiator’s goal here is to share a key with the last node in the circuit which is the exit node. This node is
important since it’s the node that will communicate to the server on behalf of the initiator.
5.3. Inner Works: Data Transfer
This scene is about anonymous communication with a particular server (responder). Once a circuit is ready and all
components share keys with each others, each node cannot recognize who is the initiator. Each node only knows about
the node before and after (through a proxy). The relay node cannot understand if itself is an entry node. The entry
node can not recognize if the initiator is any other node in the circuit. In other words, the communication between
the initiator and the responder will be anonymous through the other nodes. Neither the responder nor the nodes in the
circuit know the true identity of the initiator. Figure 4 (a) demonstrates the data transfer scenario where the initiator
is trying to fetch a web page from a web server anonymously.
5.4. Location Hidden Services
Location-hidden services or responder anonymity uses the concept of Rendezvous Points (RP) to allow servers
such as web servers to oﬀer services without revealing their true IP addresses. The VISACOR tool explains concepts
related to this topic and how it can be achieved in Tor network. As an example, Figure 4 (b) and (c) show a sample of
scenes for the demonstration of location-hidden service advertisement and registration.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4: Demonstration of: (a) data transfer scenario, (b) and (c) sample of scenes for location-hidden services.
6. Conclusion
This paper introduced a new tool that visualizes concepts related to anonymous connections via onion routing,
which can be a useful supplement to actively engage learners in information security and assurance related courses.
We discussed the importance of visualization tools in education and reviewed some of the recent related works. After
that, we dived more into the details and concepts of the onion routing to see what services it can provide and what
mechanisms it uses to achieve its goals. We also discussed security and performance issues related to onion routing.
As future work, we plan to extend the tool to add more interactions such as allowing the user to take various roles and
become part of the normal operation or to act maliciously.
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